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Abstract
We estimate a model of voting in Congress that allows for dispersed information
about the quality of proposals in an equilibrium context. The results highlight the
effects of bicameralism on policy outcomes. In equilibrium, the Senate imposes an
endogenous supermajority rule on members of the House. We estimate this super-
majority rule to be about four-fifths on average across policy areas. Moreover, our
results indicate that the value of the information dispersed among legislators is sig-
nificant, and that in equilibrium a large fraction of House members (40-50 %) vote in
accordance with their private information. Taken together, our results imply a highly
conservative Senate, in the sense that proposals are enacted into law only when it is
extremely likely that their quality is high.
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1 Introduction
One of the main arguments for bicameralism is that a bicameral legislature can improve
the quality of public policy vis-a`-vis a unicameral system (see Tsebelis and Money (1997)
and references therein). Evaluating the quality of proposals is indeed a key consideration
in legislative settings. As numerous examples and a vast literature show (see Krehbiel
(1991)), two key points seem to be largely uncontroversial. First, most issues decided in
Congress have a common value dimension, be it the technical merit of the proposal or its
appropriateness for the given state of the environment. Second, the information about these
common value components is dispersed throughout the members of Congress: no individual
knows the whole truth, but each individual has some valuable information to improve the
quality of legislation (see also Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Epstein and O’Halloran (1999),
Londregan (1999, 2000), and Hirsch and Shotts (2008)).
Given elements of common values and dispersed information, legislators will gener-
ally be able to use the information contained in the voting decisions of other members of
Congress to shape their own decision of how to vote. A natural question then emerges:
does bicameralism affect the voting behavior of members of Congress? And if so, what
are the implications for policy outcomes of adopting a bicameral legislature? This paper
addresses these questions by analyzing roll call voting data in the US Congress.
Doing so demands a fundamental change in the way we approach roll call voting data.
Beginning with the seminal contributions of Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991) a large
empirical literature made considerable progress in understanding the voting behavior of
members of the US Congress.1 This progress relied on a fully micro-founded (i.e., structural)
approach, based on the sincere (non-strategic) spatial voting model of decision-making in
committees (SSV). In other words, these analyses take the SSV model as given, and then
recover the parameters of the model as those that best fit the data.
1Within this framework, the literature tackled a diverse array of issues, including stability and polariza-
tion in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal (1991), Poole and Rosenthal (1997), McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
(2001)), the role of Committees (Poole and Rosenthal (1997), Londregan and Snyder (1994)), and the
influence of political parties (Snyder and Groseclose (2000), McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2001), Cox
and Poole (2002)).
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While the SSV model has several appealing properties, it also makes strong implicit
and explicit assumptions which shape the analysis and interpretation of roll call data. In
particular, a key limitation of applying the SSV model to Congress is that it assumes
that the legislative setting is entirely about conflict resolution, precluding legislators from
considering the technical merit or appropriateness of proposals for the given state of the
environment. As a result, the SSV model rules out by hypothesis the possibility that
bicameralism can shape the quality of public policy.2
For the same reasons, the SSV model led to a disconnection in the analysis of voting in
the two chambers of Congress. In this private values model, a legislator votes in favor of
a proposal if and only if the proposal is closer to her ideal policy than the status quo: the
votes of other members do not contain information that would help a legislator improve her
decision. In particular, legislators in one chamber cannot gain any relevant information by
observing (or conditioning on) the outcome of the vote in the other chamber. As a result,
the empirical analysis of voting in Congress treated the consideration of the same bill in
the two separate chambers as statistically (and theoretically) independent.
But with dispersed information about the quality of the proposal, a bicameral legislature
can amount to more than a sequence of separate chambers. If at least some members of
the originating chamber use their information to guide their voting decision, the outcome
of their vote will become a public signal for members of the receiving chamber. In fact,
this is consistent with anecdotal evidence from comparable political institutions with two-
tier committee systems. In universities, for example, votes for tenured appointments with
divided support in the faculty often fail at the administration level, or are not even presented
for consideration. A similar phenomenon seems to hold in committee-floor considerations
in legislatures.3 The model of common values and dispersed information suggests that
2The SSV can be extended to include a publicly known valence differential between alternatives. In fact,
as pointed out by Londregan (1999), the two models are equivalent: a valence advantage for the proposal
against the status quo is indistinguishilble from a more extreme status quo (and no valence). Thus we
cannot separately identify the midpoint between two alternatives and the valence differential. Extending
the spatial model to incorporate common values and dispersed information is a different matter. This is
the focus of this paper (see also Iaryczower and Shum (2009)).
3As Oleszek (2004) points out, bills “ voted out of committee unanimously stand a good chance on the
floor . . . [while a] sharply divided committee vote presages an equally sharp dispute on the floor” (pg. 102).
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this is due to the fact that the voting outcome in the originating committee aggregates
information about the quality of the proposal vis-a-vis the status quo. A divided vote in
an academic committee is problematic because it sends the administration a signal of low
quality; similarly, a divided vote in a standing committee signals to the full membership
that the proposal might be a poor response for the current state of affairs.4 Does the
bicameral Congress lead to the same kind of filtering of flawed proposals as in the above
examples?
We begin by establishing some basic key facts about the impact of bicameralism on
legislative outcomes. To do so, we link the votes of bills originated in the House to their
continuation in the Senate (we consider all bills that originated in the House, and whose
passage in the House was decided by a roll call vote in the 102nd to 109th Congresses; i.e.,
1991-2006). A basic analysis of the data makes two facts apparent. First, a large number
of bills approved by the House die in the Senate. In fact, 45 % of all bills passed by the
House are never taken up for consideration on final passage by the Senate, and almost
one quarter of all bills approved in the House reach consideration on final passage in the
Senate only after being heavily amended by that body.5 Second, the analysis illustrates
a previously unknown fact. As in standing committees and universities, also in the US
Congress proposals with a larger support in the originating chamber tend to be more
successful in the receiving chamber.
The correlation between voting outcomes does not necessarily rule out the SSV model:
any data with this property can be explained within the SSV model if the preferences
of members of both chambers are properly aligned. However, we show they are not: the
estimates of the SSV model that are consistent with the individual voting data generate
large errors in passage rates of the same bill across chambers.
We then characterize the equilibrium voting behavior in a theoretical framework that
4One might argue that it is not relevant whether the entire committee is divided, but instead whether
some particular subset of the membership tends to agree or be divided about the issue. This argument, as
we explain in more detail below, is not only correct but also consistent with our analysis, and simplified
here only for simplicity of exposition.
5Congressional scholars have provided anecdotal evidence suggesting that many bills passed by the
House die in the Senate. A systematic and quantitative documentation of this phenomenon, however, does
not appear to exist in the previous literature.
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is consistent with common values and dispersed information. In the model, a bicameral
legislature considers a proposal against the status quo. The proposal is considered sequen-
tially, first by the House and then (if it was approved by House) by the Senate, and has to
be approved by both chambers to be enacted into law. The proposal can be of good or bad
quality, and individuals only have imperfect private signals about its quality. All individu-
als prefer a good proposal, but individuals differ in the amount of evidence in favor of the
proposal that would induce them to vote for it. We argue that the data is consistent with
a particular class of equilibria of the theoretical model in which the Senate only approves
House bills that were passed by the vote of more than an (endogenous) R-majority of the
members of the House that vote informatively.
We estimate the model within the Bayesian framework via MCMC methods. The
statistical model comprises two steps. In the first step, we implement a finite mixture
model to estimate legislators’ types and the proposal’s common value component in six
different policy areas. In this step we also estimate the precision of legislators’ private
information. In a second step, we estimate the equilibrium cutpoint in the Senate based on
the assignment of legislators into types in the first stage and on the realized vote outcome
for each bill that passed the House.
The results highlight the effects of bicameralism on policy outcomes. First, our estimates
imply that private information (information dispersed in the system that has not been made
public and incorporated in the prior) is quite important. For one, a large fraction of the
House votes according to their private information in each case (from 40% in the case of
Appropriations bills, to a 50% in Judiciary bills). Moreover, the results show that the
informativeness or precision of the signals is relatively large across all issue areas. Thus,
large majorities are indeed informative about the quality of proposals. Second, in order to
induce this degree of informative voting, the Senate imposes an endogenous supermajority
rule on members of the House. We estimate this supermajority rule to be about four-fifths
on average across policy areas. In other words, in equilibrium bicameralism is transformed
into a unicameral system with a four-fifths supermajority rule. This endogenous majority
rule has significant variation across areas: close to two thirds for Foreign Relations, and
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larger for Economic issues (0.87) and Appropriations (0.89). Third, the result of combining
relatively informative signals and relatively large cutpoints in the Senate imply a very
conservative blocking coalition in the Senate, in the sense that proposals are enacted into
law only when it is extremely likely that their quality is high (or that they constitute an
appropriate response for the current state of the environment). The results give credit to
the genius of the Founding Fathers in establishing the Senate as a counter-majoritarian
device restraining the impulse of “sudden and violent passions” that can prevail in the
House (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison (1788)).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the related
literature. Section 3 describes the main features of the data, and considers the implications
of the SSV model for the passage or proposals across chambers. Section 4 introduces
the theoretical model and summarizes its empirical implications. Section 5 presents the
specification of the model and estimation methodology. Section 6 presents the results.
Section 7 concludes and discusses possible directions for future research.
2 Related Literature
This paper builds on an extensive literature studying the policy implications of bicameral
legislatures (see Dahl (1956), Riker (1982), Lijphart (1984) Tsebelis (1995), Tsebelis and
Money (1997), and Diermeier and Myerson (1999) among many others; see also the classical
analysis of Montesquieu (1748), and Hamilton, Jay, and Madison (1788)).6
Our paper focuses on what Tsebelis and Money (1997) call the efficiency rationale for
bicameralism, emphasizing the importance of common values in the legislative setting (see
Rogers (1998, 2001)). Different than previous contributions, our argument emphasizes the
importance of dispersed information about the quality of proposals. As such, our analysis
is connected with the literature on strategic transmission of information from specialized
committees to the full chamber pioneered by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) and Krehbiel
(1991).7 Differently than in the Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) (and Crawford and Sobel
6For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Tsebelis and Money (1997), Longley and Oleszek
(1989), Cutrone and McCarty (2006), and references therein.
7To be clear, in Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987)’s theoretical framework legislators are uncertain about the
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(1982)) cheap talk models, the focus here is on communication through voting. Moreover,
an important innovation of our analysis is that we focus on the strategic considerations
among members in different chambers, each of them a (multimember) committee. To
do so, we build on the theoretical literature on strategic voting with common values and
incomplete information (Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997,
1998)), and in particular on the analysis dealing with strategic interactions among members
of different committees (Piketty (2000), Maug and Yilmaz (2002), Razin (2003), and in
particular Iaryczower (2008)).
On the methodological side, our paper is related to the various contributions analyzing
the voting behavior of members of Congress starting from an underlying model of behavior.
The seminal paper here is Poole and Rosenthal (1985), where - starting from the assump-
tion that the data is generated according to the sincere voting spatial model - Poole and
Rosenthal develop NOMINATE, a method to estimate the parameters of the spatial model:
legislators’ ideal points and separating hyperplanes for each roll call.8 Londregan (1999)
allows a (publicly known) valence advantage in the spatial voting model, and proposes to
incorporate features of the process of agenda formation to deal with the incidental param-
eters problem present in the agnostic SSV (see also Londregan (2000), and Clinton and
Meirowitz (2003, 2004)). Our paper joins these efforts to incorporate strategic considera-
tions into the analysis of voting in legislatures. To our knowledge, our paper represents the
first study to estimate a model of voting in legislatures that allows for common values with
dispersed information in an equilibrium context (see also Iaryczower and Shum (2009)).
precise mapping from policy to outcomes. However, as Hirsch and Shotts (2008) point out, “many of the
examples of information and expertise in Krehbiel (1991) are better described by a model of information
as policy-specific valence than by the x = p + ω model.” See also Epstein and O’Halloran (1999). More-
over, with risk averse legislators, and under some conditions, reducing the uncertainty about the policy
implications of a proposal is equivalent to improving its quality.
8Still based on the spatial model with sincere voting, Heckman and Snyder (1997), Jackman (2001),
and Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) propose alternatives estimation methods. Heckman and Snyder
build on the random utility model with unobservable attributes for the characteristics of the bill and the
status quo. Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) develops a Bayesian procedure for the estimation and
inference of spatial models of roll call voting (see also Jackman (2001)).
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3 Bicameralism and Legislative Outcomes
In this section we describe the data and document how the sequential organization of the
U.S. Congress affects legislative outcomes. In Section 3.1 we use these data to evaluate the
performance of the SSV in terms of aggregate voting outcomes.
Our data consists of all bills that were originated in the House, and whose passage
in the House was decided by a roll call vote over the period 1991-2006 (Congresses 102
through 109).9 By bills, we refer loosely to both bills (say H.R. 100) and Joint Resolutions
(say H.J.Res.100) - which have the same effect as bills unless they are used to propose
amendments to the Constitution.We say that a bill was originated in the House if the
bill was voted on final passage in the House before being voted on final passage in the
Senate. We consider here only votes on final passage, thus ignoring votes on procedure or
amendments. Moreover, we consider only bills that passed the House by a roll call vote, in
which members’ votes are recorded individually, and that record made publicly available
prior to consideration of the bill in the Senate.
Under the House rules, bills are considered for approval by a simple majority vote of
Representatives in a vote on passage (OP). Bills can also be approved in the House by
an alternative streamlined procedure, called suspend the rules and pass (SRP). In a SRP
vote, debate is restricted, amendments are not allowed, and the bill has to be approved by
a two-thirds majority of the votes. Our data consists of bills considered on final passage
either by a standard on passage vote, or by the SRP procedure. Between 1991 and 2006,
950 House bills had a roll call on passage, and 861 had a roll call vote on SRP.10
To be considered approved by Congress, bills need to be passed in identical form by
the House and the Senate.11 Once a bill is passed by House, its fate in the Senate can
9In principle, it would be desirable to also include bills originated in the Senate. Unfortunately, during
the period under study only a very small number of the bills originated in the Senate passed in the Senate
by a roll call vote. Due to this data availability restriction, in this paper we limit our analysis to bills that
originated in the House. We leave a more comprehensive analysis for future research.
10It is worth noting that “most” bills put up for a vote on final passage in the House do in fact pass the
House. Specifically, this amounted to more than 90 % of the 1811 votes on final passage in our database.
11If the House and the Senate pass different versions of a bill, their disagreements are often resolved
through a conference committee, an ad hoc joint committee composed of delegations of both chambers.
Conferees usually draft a modified version of the bill in question, which is subsequently considered sequen-
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be classified in three categories. We consider that a bill passes (P ) if it is approved by
the Senate without any amendments during the same Congressional session in which it is
initiated in the House. An original bill is considered to be passed amended (A) if it is
approved by the Senate with amendments during the same Congressional session in which
it is initiated in the House. We also consider that a bill is passed amended if it fails in the
Senate by inaction, but a related bill (as classified by the Library of Congress, in Thomas)
that reached the chamber’s floor passed the Senate. Finally a bill fails (F ) if it reaches
the Senate floor and is voted down, or if it is never taken up for consideration. The latter
case occurs when: (a) no action whatsoever is taken in the Senate during the Congress in
which the House passed the bill; (b) a bill is never reported to the Floor by the Senate
committee to which it was referred; (c) the bill does not progress after being placed on
the Senate’s legislative calendar; or (d) the bill fails on a vote on cloture on the motion
to proceed. Regardless of the particular way in which it takes place, Senatorial inaction is
akin to killing a bill. Figure 1 presents the fate of House bills in the Senate.
[Figure 1 about here]
The figure illustrates two key points. First, a fairly significant fraction of bills that reach
the Senate (38 percent) do get voted in the Senate as is. Moreover, once put up for a vote,
almost all of these bills in fact pass the vote in the Senate (only one in seventy seven bills
voted by roll call, and one in four hundred and thirty two bills voted by voice vote failed to
pass). However, being up for consideration in the Senate is hardly a synonym of success. In
fact, a staggering 37 percent (718) of the House bills that reached the Senate in the period
under study were not taken up for consideration on final passage: 75 were ignored, 481
never made it out of committee, 200 were reported out of committee and put on calendar
but were never voted, and 10 failed a vote to pass a filibuster. In addition, almost a quarter
of the bills (475) only reached consideration for final passage after being heavily amended
by the body. Thus, a second fact is that - even before considering amendments - a large
number of bills that passed the House die in the Senate. It follows that if legislators are
tially under a closed rule by the House and the Senate. Our sample includes 237 bills that were considered
by the House for a final passage roll call vote after a conference committee.
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outcome oriented and strategic, analyzing voting outcomes independently across chambers,
without linking votes and outcomes to its continuation in the receiving chamber, can be
problematic.
The figure has two additional implications. First, the selection of bills into OP or SRP
considerations is not random or innocuous. Pieces of legislation that were approved in the
House using the SRP procedure (and thus received the support of at least two-thirds of its
members) were more likely to be approved without amendments by the Senate than bills
approved by a simple majority (OP). The opposite is true with regard to those bills that
were approved after being heavily amended in the Senate. House bills that were approved
in the House using simple majority (OP) are more likely to be approved with amendments
by the Senate than bills approved using a SRP procedure. Note also that bills approved in
the House using simple majority (OP) are more likely to fail than those passed under SRP.
Second, the figure also suggests that after a bill is voted by the two chambers, and a
compromise is reached within the conference committee, all private information is made
public, and no uncertainty about the quality of the bill remains. In fact, there is almost no
variation in outcomes after a bill is reported from the conference committee: approximately
95 percent of these bills (225) were passed (without amendments) once they reached the
Senate. We henceforth exclude these bills from our analyses.
Support for the Bill in the House: Does it Matter? As we mentioned in the intro-
duction, a stylized fact from bicameral systems in various political institutions is that pro-
posals that pass the originating committee without significant objections tend to be more
successful in the receiving committee than those proposals that clear the first committee
with a contested vote. Does the bicameral system in Congress lead to similar outcomes?
To tackle this question, we begin by considering whether the outcome of the bill in the
Senate is “correlated” with the fraction of members of the House supporting the bill. To
measure this aggregate support, we compute the net tally of votes in favor of the proposal
in the House (number of “aye” votes minus number of “nay” votes) for each bill in the
sample. The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the distribution (kernel density estimates) of
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the net tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the House conditional on two possible
outcomes in the Senate: the bill passes (P ) and the bill fails (F ).
[Figure 2 about here]
The figure shows a significant difference in the Pass and Fail conditional distributions,
especially for bills considered On Passage. The distribution of the tally in the House
conditional on a Senate Fail (a Senate Pass) puts a relatively large probability mass on low
(high) values of the tally. In other words, bills that are approved by the Senate tend to
have higher tallies in the House than bills that fail in the Senate.12
The same conclusion holds if we separate bills by different policy areas. To do this, we
use the committee/s to which the bill was referred to classify each roll call as pertaining to
one of six policy areas: Appropriations, Foreign Relations, Economic Activity, Judiciary,
Government Operations, and Others.13 The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the “Senate
Fail” and “Senate Pass” conditional distributions of the net tally of votes in favor of the
proposal in the House for votes On Passage in Appropriations and Judiciary. Once again,
the evidence indicates that pieces of legislation that were approved in the House with a
larger net number of favorable votes are more likely to be approved by the Senate than
bills approved with less legislative support.
3.1 The Sincere Voting Spatial Model in Bicameral Perspective
The findings in the previous section are consistent with, but do not necessarily imply, that
the tally of votes in the House is transmitting relevant information to members of the
Senate. In particular, the correlation between the tally of favorable votes in the House and
12In fact, we can say more. Bills that passed the Senate typically have higher tallies in the House than
bills that pass amended in the Senate, and these in turn have higher tallies than bills that fail in the Senate.
13We obtained the basic referral information from the Library of Congress, in Thomas. We classify
a bill in “Appropriations” if it was referred to the Appropriations committee, and to “Other” if it was
referred to multiple committees. If a bill was referred to a single committee other than appropriations,
we classify it in one of the remaining four classes: Foreign Relations (includes Foreign Affairs, Armed
Services, National Security, Veterans’ Affairs, Homeland Security and Intelligence), Economic Activity
(includes Agriculture, Science, Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Natural
Resources, Small Business, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries), Judi-
ciary (includes Judiciary), and Government Operations (includes Budget, Government Reform, and Ways
and Means).
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the outcomes in the Senate could also be consistent with the sincere voting spatial model.
If the preferences of members of both houses are highly correlated, then proposals that only
receive the support of a small number of House members should also receive the support
of a small number of Senators, while proposals that are overwhelmingly preferred to the
status quo in the House should also be preferred to the status quo by a winning coalition
in the Senate.
It should be clear, however, that the estimates of the SSV model that are consistent
with the individual voting data will not necessarily be consistent with the responsiveness
of the outcome in the Senate to the tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the House. For
example, if preferences are perfectly aligned across chambers and both committees decide
by simple majority rule, then all proposals that clear the first committee will clear the
second committee as well. This, however, would be inconsistent with the passage rates
described in the previous section. As a result, while not necessarily ruling out the SSV
model, the correlation in voting outcomes suggest that the match between the data and
the model should be reconsidered.
In this section we evaluate this alternative hypothesis using Poole and Rosenthal’s Opti-
mal Classification (OC) common-space estimates. OC is a non-parametric scaling method
that maximizes the number of correctly classified choices (individual votes), assuming that
legislators have euclidean preferences and vote sincerely. In the common-space procedure,
OC is used to simultaneously scale every session of both houses of Congress, using leg-
islators who served in both chambers to place the House and Senate in the same space.
Hence, the estimates of the ideal points/roll call cutpoints are directly comparable across
both chambers.
The sincere-voting spatial model is characterized by two sets of parameters. The first
is the set of legislators’ ideal points in the House and the Senate. Second, for each roll
call, there is an associated separating line L, that partitions the space into two half spaces.
Legislators with ideal points to either side of L are predicted to vote “aye” and “nay”,
respectively. The basic idea is to use the separating line estimated for each roll call in the
House, together with the estimates of the ideal points of Senators to obtain a predicted
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outcome in the Senate. Having done this, we can then compare the predicted and actual
outcomes in the Senate.
Specifically, we proceed as follows. We take Keith Poole’s OC estimates for the spatial
voting model as given.14 The set of estimates includes the following elements: for each
legislator, (i) his/her ideal point; and for each roll call of a bill originated in the House,
(ii) the normal vector N = (n1, n2) (perpendicular to L), (iii) the projected midpoint on
the normal vector, `, and (iv) the polarity (where the “ayes” and “nays” fell relative to
the projected midpoint on the normal vector). Points on the normal vector N = (n1, n2)
are points (x1, x2) such that x2 = x1
n2
n1
. A line perpendicular to N (parallel to L) passing
through the point z = (z1, z2) - call it L(z1, z2) - is then given by
L(z1, z2) ≡ {(x1, x2) : n1(z1 − x1) + (z2 − x2)n2 = 0}.
Thus the projection onto N of an ideal point (z1, z2) is given by the intersection of N
and L(z1, z2),
(zˆ1, zˆ2) =
(
n1
n21 + n
2
2
(n1z1 + n2z2),
n2
n21 + n
2
2
(n1z1 + n2z2)
)
,
and its relative location on the normal vector is then given by d(zˆ, 0) × sign(zˆ1 × n1).
Combining the projection of Senators’ ideal points to the normal vector with the projected
midpoint on the normal vector for a given roll call, `, and its polarity, we then obtain
a predicted vote for each Senator for each (scaled) roll call in our sample. Finally, us-
ing these predictions, we calculate – for each bill originated in the House – a predicted
(counterfactual) pass/fail outcome in the Senate.
Figure 3 presents the comparison between the predicted outcomes generated using the
OC estimates and the actual Senate outcomes. The top panel shows the results assuming
that a simple majority rule is used to determine a bill’s passage in the Senate. The bottom
panel presents a similar exercise using a three-fifths majority rule, as required for cloture.
[Figure 3 about here]
14These estimates are publicly available at http://voteview.com/oc.htm.
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The evidence in Figure 3 clearly indicates that the standard (private-values) spatial
model with sincere voting generates predictions that are at odds with the data. Consider,
for example, the 106th Congress’ predictions assuming that a simple majority voting rule is
used. According to the sincere voting spatial model, 156 bills should have been approved by
the Senate (and only 1 should have failed). Instead, 43 were approved after being heavily
amended, and 68 actually failed. A similar pattern holds for the other sessions of Congress.
The predicted power of the spatial model improves if we assume that a three-fifths majority
decision rule is employed. Nonetheless, as Figure 3 demonstrates, the spatial model still
generates large errors when it is used to predict bills’ passage rates across chambers.
4 Dispersed Information in Bicameral Legislatures: A
Theoretical Framework
The analysis of the previous section suggests that the standard spatial model with sin-
cere voting generates large errors in passage rates of the same bill across chambers. In
this section, we develop the implications of a theoretical framework that is consistent with
common values and dispersed information. We consider here the model of strategic vot-
ing with common value components introduced in Iaryczower (2008). The model develops
formally a simple intuition: if legislators have private information about the relative value
of the alternatives under consideration, voting outcomes in the originating chamber can
aggregate and transmit relevant information to members of the receiving chamber. The
model builds on the contributions of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), and Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1997, 1998). Here, however, voting does not occur in single-committee sys-
tems, but instead a proposal can prevail only by defeating the status quo by (possibly
qualified) majority voting first in one and, provided it is successful there, then in a second
chamber.
The possibility of observing the outcome of the vote in the originating chamber intro-
duces two main differences in the incentives of members of both chambers vis a vis the
single-committee framework. First, the tally of the votes in favor of the alternative be-
comes an informative public signal for members of the receiving chamber, whose members
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can condition their behavior on the voting outcome in the originating chamber. Second,
members of the originating chamber can influence the outcome both in the traditional
sense of killing or passing the proposal in their chamber (a standard-pivotal voting mo-
tive), and/or by influencing the beliefs of members of the receiving chamber regarding the
relative value of the two alternatives (a signal-pivotal voting motive).
The Model. A group of legislators arranged in two chambers, C0 and C1, choose between
a proposal A and a status quo Q, both lying in an arbitrary policy space X. Chamber Cj
is populated by an odd number nj of individuals, and the collective choice of each chamber
j is determined by voting under a Rj-majority rule. Formally, letting vi ∈ {−1, 1} denote
i’s vote against (−1) or in favor (1) of the proposal, t(vj) ≡
∑
i∈Cj vi the net tally of votes
in favor of the proposal in Cj, and zj ∈ {Q,A} the policy choice in Cj, zj = A if and only
if t(vj) ≥ rj, for an odd integer rj such that 1 ≤ rj ≤ nj (thus Rj = nj+rj2 ).
Voting is simultaneous within each chamber, but sequential between chambers.15 The
alternatives are first voted on in the originating chamber C0, or the House. If the proposal
defeats the status quo in the originating chamber, the alternatives are then voted on in the
receiving chamber C1, or the Senate. The proposal is adopted if and only if it defeats the
status quo in both committees, tj(vj) ≥ rj for j = 0, 1, otherwise the status quo remains.
The proposal can be of high or low quality, and this is unobservable to all legislators. We
represent this state by an unobservable random variable ω ∈ {ωA, ωQ}, where ωA denotes
high quality. We denote the prior probability of the proposal being of high quality by
Pr(ω = ωA) = p. Each individual i ∈ Cj receives a private, imperfectly informative signal
si ∈ {−1, 1}, distributed independently conditional on the quality of the proposal, such
that Pr(si = 1|ωA) = Pr(si = −1|ωQ) = q > 1/2.
Individuals’ preferences have an ideological and a common value component. Each
individual i ∈ Cj has a publicly known ideology bias either for or against the proposal, and
we say that i is either a liberal or a conservative, respectively. Liberals and conservatives
differ in their ranking of alternatives conditional on observing the same information I.
15The result of Proposition 1 below is unchanged if voting within each chamber is done sequentially.
14
In particular, liberals prefer the proposal to the status quo whenever Pr(ωA|I) ≥ piA
for some piA < 1/2, while conservatives prefer the proposal to the status quo whenever
Pr(ωA|I) ≥ piQ for some piQ > 1/2. More formally, we normalize the payoff for both types if
the proposal is not passed to zero, and denote the payoff of an individual of type b ∈ {Q,A}
if the proposal passes in state ω by Uωb , with U
A
b = 1−pib > 0 and UQb = −pib < 0. Thus the
individual wants the proposal passed given I if Pr(ωA|I)[1− pib] + [1− Pr(ωA|I)](−pib) ≥
0⇔ Pr(ωA|I) ≥ pib. We denote the number of individuals of type b in chamber j by nbj. The
equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies, with a refinement: with
probability 1− υ, a committee member i is a moderate, and has the preferences described
above; with probability υ > 0, she is a partisan and always votes her bias. We focus on
equilibria of the game for small υ.
The model admits multiple voting equilibria. For our purposes, it is useful to separate
these in two classes. In a first class, the proposal can fail and succeed on a vote in the
receiving chamber with positive probability. In a second class, it cannot. The fact that
in the US Congress data House bills are never killed on a vote on the Senate floor rules
out the first class of voting equilibria as possible data generating processes in this partic-
ular application. The remaining voting equilibria is the class of endogenous majority rule
(EMR) voting equilibria. In an EMR voting equilibrium, the second chamber acts only to
raise the hurdle that the alternative has to surpass in the first chamber to defeat the status
quo, killing the proposal following low vote tallies in the originating chamber, and uncon-
ditionally approving the proposal otherwise. It follows that in a EMR voting equilibrium
it is common knowledge for members of the receiving chamber whether the proposal will
pass the senate or not after observing the outcome of the vote in the house. Thus while
passing the proposal requires its approval in a vote on the floor, it is immaterial whether
the proposal is killed in a vote, by scheduling, or by burying it in a Committee.16
16The other possible class of equilibria in which members of the originating chamber vote informatively is
that two-sided informative (TSI) voting equilibria. In TSI voting equilibria, members of both committees
vote informatively. In particular, in any equilibrium of this class the probability of the proposal being
accepted increases (strictly) with the tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the originating committee.
To achieve this, the number of individuals voting informatively in the receiving committee must vary
following different vote tallies in the originating committee. Implicit in the construction of equilibria of
this kind is therefore the requirement that the proposal can fail and succeed on a vote in the receiving
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In order to characterize EMR equilibria, it will be convenient to measure agents’ biases
in terms of the least net number of positive (negative) signals that a conservative (liberal)
member would need to observe to vote for (against) the proposal. We call these signal
thresholds ρQ (for conservatives) and ρA (for liberals). Note that given information I, an
individual with bias pi prefers the proposal to the status quo if and only if Pr(I|ωA)
Pr(I|ωQ) ≥ pi1−pi
1−p
p
.
Note moreover that
Pr(s:
P
i si=τ |ωA)
Pr(s:
P
i si=τ |ωQ) =
(
q
1−q
)τ
. Thus, focusing on ρQ for example,
ρQ ≡ min
{
τ :
(
q
1− q
)τ
≥ pi
1− pi
1− p
p
}
. (1)
The following proposition fully characterizes EMR voting equilibria.
Proposition 1 (1) If conservatives can block the proposal in the receiving chamber, there
exists an EMR voting equilibrium if and only if the number of conservative members
in the originating chamber is at least ρQ. In an equilibrium of this class, ρQ ≤ k ≤
min{nQ0 , ρQ+n0−(r0−1)} conservatives in the originating chamber vote informatively,
and the Senate passes the bill if and only if the net tally of votes of individuals voting
informatively is above ρQ.
(2) If conservatives cannot block the proposal in the receiving chamber, then there exists an
EMR voting equilibrium if and only if the majority surplus of liberals in the originating
chamber,
nA0 −nQ0 −r0
2
is at least ρA. In an equilibrium of this class, ρA ≤ k ≤ nA0 −
nQ0 − r0 − ρA liberals vote informatively in the originating chamber and the proposal
fails in the receiving chamber if and only if the net tally of votes of individuals voting
informatively in the house is below −ρA.
Proof. See Theorem 1 in Iaryczower (2008).
Proposition 1 provides the theoretical foundations of the econometric specification that
we describe in the next section.
committee with positive probability. This is inconsistent with the bicameral data, for which proposals are
killed in Committee or scheduling, but not on votes on the floor.
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5 Estimation
5.1 Econometric Specification
In EMR voting equilibria, only members of the originating chamber vote informatively, the
second committee acts only to raise the hurdle that the alternative has to surpass in the
first chamber to defeat the status quo in equilibrium. As a result, the votes of individual
members of the receiving chamber (here the Senate) do not provide relevant information for
the econometrician. In the originating chamber instead (here the House), all votes contain
useful information to recover the structure of the model: (i) the prior probability of the
quality of the proposal being high, (ii) the type of each individual, and (iii) the precision of
their private information. The data therefore consists of an n× T matrix v of voting data
in the House, and a 1× (T −TF ) vector z of outcomes of House bills in the Senate. Here T
is the number of votes in which the House is the originating committee, TF is the number
of votes in the House in which the proposal failed in the House, and n is the number of
legislators in the house. Column t is therefore the voting record for all legislators in the
house in roll call t, vt, with ith entry vit ∈ {−1, 1, ∅}.
To control for the effect that the heterogeneity in policy areas might have on equilibrium
behavior, we allow preferences, information technology and equilibrium strategies to vary
between policy issues. In particular, we assume that the prior probability of the state being
favorable for the proposal, the precision of private information and the voting strategy of
each individual are invariant within issues but can differ between issues. Let α denote the
assignment of roll calls t = 1, . . . , T to classes g = 1, . . . , G according to the classification
in issue areas of Section 3.
Within each class g, therefore, the preferences and voting strategy of each member of
the House are fixed, and can be summarized by a type θig ∈ {Y, I,N}. Here θig = Y de-
notes i is a partisan-liberal in class g, who supports proposals independently of her private
information. Similarly, θig = N means i opposes the proposals in class g independently of
her private information (i is a partisan-conservative). Finally, θig = I if i votes informa-
tively in class g, supporting the proposal when si = 1 but voting against it when si = −1.
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The type of an individual i is therefore a 1 × G vector θi ≡ (θi1, . . . , θiG). The precision
of signals is also allowed to vary per class, so that q ≡ (q1, . . . , qG). The common prior
of the state being favorable to the proposal is also issue-specific. Given independence of
states between roll calls, which we assume throughout, then Pr(ωt = ωA) = pα(t), and
p ≡ (p1, . . . , pG). For each class g there is also an EMR voting equilibrium cutpoint ζg in
the Senate. The vector of Senate equilibrium cutpoints is then ζ ≡ (ζ1, . . . , ζG). Finally,
we assume that there is a probability of error µ at the individual level, so that whenever
equilibrium behavior dictates a vote v ∈ {−1, 1}, the observed value is v with probability
1− µ and −v with probability µ. We can then write down an expression for the likelihood
of data y = (v, z) given (q, p, θ, ζ). First,
Pr(y|q, p, θ, ζ) =
G∏
g=1
∏
t:α(t)=g
Pr(yt|pg, qg, θg, ζg), (2)
Next, given α(t) = g, since the outcome in the Senate depends only on the relevant
cutpoint ζg and on the informative tally, itself a function only of vt and θg, then
Pr(yt|pg, qg, θg, ζg) = Pr(vt|pg, qg, θg) Pr(zt|vt, θg, ζg).
Next we obtain an expression for Pr(vt|pg, qg, θg). For a = N, I, Y , let ma(t, g) ≡ |{i ∈
C1 : θi = a, vit = 1}| and `a(t, g) ≡ |{i ∈ C1 : θi = a, vit = −1}| denote the number of
individuals of type a in group g voting in favor and against the bill, respectively. Now, let
κg ≡ [qg(1 − µ) + (1 − qg)µ] denote the probability that an individual i such that θig = I
votes in favor (against) of the proposal in roll call t if ωt = 1 (if ωt = 0). Then
Pr({vit}i:θig=I |qg, pg) =
[
pgκ
mI(t,g)
g (1− κg)`I(t,g) + (1− pg)(1− κg)mI(t,g)κ`I(t,g)g
]
.
Moreover, since Pr(vit = 1|θig = N) = µ, and Pr(vit = 1|θig = Y ) = 1 − µ, then
Pr({vit}i:θig=N) = µmN (t,g)(1− µ)`N (t,g) and Pr({vit}i:θig=Y ) = (1− µ)mY (t,g)µ`Y (t,g), so that
Pr(vt|qg, pg, θg) = µmN (t,g)(1− µ)`N (t,g) × (1− µ)mY (t,g)µ`Y (t,g)
× [pgκmI(t,g)g (1− κg)`I(t,g) + (1− pg)(1− κg)mI(t,g)κ`I(t,g)g ] . (3)
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Consider now Pr(zt|vt, θg, ζg). Assume first that in the data we observe a binary
Pass/Fail outcome in the Senate zt ∈ {0, 1}, as it is in the theory. Let τt(g, vt) ≡
∑
i:θig=I
vi
denote the informative tally in roll call t. We introduce noise εt in the class g cutpoint ζg so
that zt = 1 if and only if τt(g, vt) ≥ ζg + t, or equivalently if εt ≤ τt(g, vt)− ζg. Assuming
that t is i.i.d. with c.d.f. F (·), then (again, for α(t) = g)
Pr(zt|vt, θg, ζg) = [F (τt(g, vt)− ζg)]zt [1− F (τt(g, vt)− ζg)]1−zt .
In the data, however, we observe not two but three outcomes in the Senate: bills that
Fail, bills that Pass without being amended, and bills that Pass after being amended in
the Senate. We proceed as follows. We assume that bills either Pass or Fail, but that this
final outcome zt ∈ {0, 1} is unobservable. What we observe is an imperfect signal of this
final outcome, zˆ ∈ {P,A, F}. In particular, we assume that Pr(zˆt = A|zt = 0) = 1 − η,
Pr(zˆt = F |zt = 0) = η, Pr(zˆt = A|zt = 1) = 1− γ, and Pr(zˆt = P |zt = 0) = γ. Given these
we have:
Pr(zˆt|τt(g, vt), ζg) = [γF (τt(g, vt)− ζg)]I(zˆt=P ) × [η(1− F (τt(g, vt)− ζg))]I(zˆt=F )
× [(1− γ)F (τt(g, vt)− ζg) + (1− η)(1− F (τt(g, vt)− ζg))]I(zˆt=A).
(4)
5.2 Estimation Methodology
To estimate the model, we adopt a Bayesian approach. In this setting, the objects of anal-
ysis are the distributions of the parameters (q, p, ζ, {θi}). We follow a two-step estimation
procedure. In the first step, we use the observed votes of each legislator in each issue class
g to estimate class-specific posterior distributions of the signal precision qg, the assignment
of legislators into types θi,g ∈ {N, I, Y }, and the assignment of roll calls t into the set of
possible realizations of the unobservable state {ωQ, ωA}. In the second step, we compute
the average informative tally for each bill in class g based on the a posteriori assignment
of legislators into types, and estimate the EMR equilibrium cutpoint ζg. Both steps rely
on Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods (Gilks, Richardson, and Spiegelhalter
(1996), Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004)).17
17It is in fact possible to integrate both steps in a single estimation procedure. Given the complexity
of the problem, however, the computational burden of a single-step estimation approach renders it very
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First Stage. The main idea underlying the estimation of the model is that the vote of
legislator i in a roll call t depends only on her type θi and the realization of the state ωt
(we drop for convenience the dependence on the issue class g when there is no room for
confusion). From (2) and (3), estimating q would be straightforward if we knew the type
of each legislator and the realization of the state in each roll call. The problem of course
is that θ and ω are not observable. To address this complication, the first step of our
estimation strategy implements a latent class or finite mixture model.
Latent class analysis is useful to explain heterogeneity in observed categorical variables
(e.g., votes) in terms of a small number of underlying latent classes or groups (e.g., legis-
lators’ types and state realizations). The observations in the sample are assumed to arise
from mutually exclusive classes characterized by intra-group homogeneity and inter-group
differences in behavioral or attitudinal patterns, with the association between the observed
indicators assumed to be entirely explained by their relationship to a latent categorical
variable (see for example McLachlan and Peel (2000)). In our model, these latent variables
are the types θ and the state ω. We then adopt an ex post specification for the state, where
the state parameter is given by ω (as opposed to p in an ex ante formulation). Since ωt
is independent across t, we can then estimate p from the hyperparameter describing the
distribution of ωt (more on this below).
Compared to similar latent trait models and to traditional cluster, factor and discrim-
inant analysis techniques, latent class models provide a clearer and more robust way of
summarizing patterns of categorical responses while imposing less restrictive distributional
assumptions (Hagenaars and Halman (1989), Huang and Bandeen Roche (2004)). As a
result, they have recently found a growing number of uses in political science (Blaydes and
Linzer (2008), Jackman (2008), Treier and Jackman (2008)). Virtually all applications in
the political science literature, though, assume a single relevant classification dimension.
In our setting, however, we need to classify both legislators into types and roll calls
into states. To implement this, we draw on recent developments on two-sided clustering
impractical for dealing with multiple large datasets, as in our case. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning
that, using small simulated datasets, we found little difference in the main substantive conclusions drawn
from models estimated under the two procedures.
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methods used in collaborative filtering (Ungar and Foster (1998), Hoffman and Puzicha
(1999)), implementing a fully Bayesian approach based on the Gibbs sampling algorithm
that allows for the (probabilistic) classification of legislators into types and roll calls into
states while simultaneously estimating q.18 The unknown types and states are treated
as random variables with missing values, which in the Bayesian framework are essentially
indistinguishable from other model parameters. Inference thus requires defining a prior for
the indicators of type/state and the remaining model parameters and sampling from their
joint posterior distribution.
Specifically, we proceed as follows. First, we specify a prior distribution for the param-
eters θ, ω, q.19 In particular, we assume that (i) q ∼ U [1/2, 1], that (ii) for each i ∈ N ,
Pr(θi = j) = λj for j = N, I, Y , and that (iii) for each roll call t ∈ T , Pr(ωt = ωA) = p.
We give the hyperparameters λj and p diffuse prior distributions fλ and fp. We can then
write a joint posterior distribution for the vector (θ, ω, q;λ, p),
f(θ, ω, q;λ, p|v) ∝ Pr(v|θ, ω, q)f(θ, ω, q|λ, p)fλ(λ)fp(p).
Note that given {θi} and {ωt}, the mixture model essentially reduces to a standard
binary choice model, and it is thus quite straightforward to sample from the conditional
distribution of the remaining parameters. Hence, the sampling algorithm implemented al-
ternates two major steps (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004)): (i) obtaining draws
from the distribution of θi and ωt given p, λ, and q; and (ii) obtaining draws from q
and the hyperparameters p, λ given the type/state realizations. This leads to an itera-
tive scheme whereby, starting from an arbitrary set of initial values, we obtain a sample
of the parameters ψm = (pm, λm, qm, θm, ωm) for each step m of the sampling algorithm,
m = 1, . . . ,M . Under mild regularity conditions, the sampled parameters ψm asymptoti-
18The standard expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm typically used to fitting latent class models
cannot be efficiently formulated for this problem, since untractably many sufficient statistics are required
for the EM formulation (Ungar and Foster (1998)).
19Note that this treats the voting error µ as given. In the results that we report in Section 6, we fix
this at µ = 0.10. All major conclusions remain unchanged if we set µ = 0.05. Moreover, we also repeated
the analysis including µ as an additional parameter to be estimated with the remaining parameters of the
model. Again, the results are fundamentally unchanged. Furthermore, the estimated µ ranges between
values of 0.10 and 0.15 in all policy areas. These results are reproduced in Figures 2,3 and 4 in the
Supplementary Materials Appendix.
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cally satisfy ψm ∼ P (ψ|vg) (Gilks, Richardson, and Spiegelhalter (1996), Gelman, Carlin,
Stern, and Rubin (2004)).20
Given the convergent samples of types θ, we assign each legislator to a type and each
roll call to a state based on their maximum a-posteriori probabilities (MAP). Given this
assignment, we compute the net informative tally τt(vt) ≡
∑
i:θi=I
vi for all bills that passed
the House. Together with the outcome of the bill in the Senate, the net informative tallies
computed in this way become the data in the second stage.
Second Stage. In the second step of the procedure, we estimated the EMR equilibrium
cutpoints ζg for g = 1, . . . , G. Consistent with (4), we assumed that the observed outcomes
zˆt are conditionally distributed zˆt∼Multinomial(1, ϕt), with ϕt = (ϕPt , ϕAt , ϕFt )′ and, for
j = P,A, F :
ϕjt = γjP (zt = 1|τt(g, vt), ζg) + ηjP (zt = 0|τt(g, vt), ζg) (5)
P
(
zt = 1|τt(g, vt), ζg
)
= Φ
(
τt(g, vt)− ζg
)
(6)
where γF = ηP = 0, γA = 1−γP , ηA = 1−ηF , and where Φ is the cdf of a standard normal
variable. Given the relatively small number of roll calls assigned to some of the classes, we
used a hierarchical specification to “borrow strength” across them (Gelman, Carlin, Stern,
and Rubin (2004), Gelman and Hill (2007)), assigning a N(µζ , σζ) distribution to ζg.
For each step of the estimation procedure, three parallel chains with dispersed initial
values and varying lengths were run after an initial burn-in period, with convergence as-
sessed based on Gelman and Rubin’s potential scale reduction factors R̂ (Gelman and
Rubin (1992)). We used independent priors for the parameters in ψ: we assumed that λ
has a uniform Dirichlet distribution, that p ∼ U [0, 1], and that q ∼ U [1/2, 1]. For the pa-
rameters of the second stage, we assumed µςg ∼ N (0, 100), σςg ∼ InverseGamma(0.1, 0.1),
20A well known difficulty with MCMC estimation of posterior distributions in latent class models is
the “label switching” problem stemming from the fact that permutations of the class assignments are
not necessarily identifiable since the likelihood may be unchanged under these permutations (Redner and
Walker (1984)). Label switching is less of an issue in our model, given the constraints on legislators’s voting
behavior derived from the theoretical model. In fact, visual inspection of the MCMC chains showed no
evidence of label switching, and application of the decision-theoretic post-processing approach described
by Stephens (2000) did not result in changes in the class assignments.
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γ, η ∼ Dirichlet(1, 1).
Routine sensitivity checks were performed to assess the robustness of the estimates
to the prior distributions. In all cases, the average overlap the between prior and pos-
terior distribution for the parameters governing the latent class membership probabilities
was quite small, and the (empirical) Kullback-Leibler divergences were extremely high.21
This indicates that there is enough data to distinguish between the different types and
states, suggesting that the model is well identified, and thus relatively insensitive to prior
assumptions (Garrett and Zeger (2000), Elliot, Gallo, Ten, Bogner, and Katz (2005)).
Posterior predictive simulations based on the subject-level statistic S =
∑
t vi,t indicated
that the (conditionally) independent Bernoulli distribution for legislators’ votes is rea-
sonable (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004)). The posterior predictive p-value∑
rep I
(∑
t v
rep
i,t >
∑
t vi,t
)
/
∑
rep I based on 1,000 replications ranged between 0.13 to 0.82
across legislators. In addition, in order to check the ability of our estimation strategy to
recover the “true” model parameters and class memberships, we used “fake-data simula-
tions” (Gelman and Hill (2007)) with several alternative datasets. Classifying legislators
and rollcalls acording to the MAP led to very high rates of success in terms of agreement
between actual and estimated class membership, and the central 95% credible intervals
for the parameters of interest covered in all cases the true values, with point estimates
reasonably close to them.22
6 Results
In this section we present the main results. For presentation purposes, we focus here on
non-unanimous votes On Passage.23 The main results are summarized in Figure 4.
21Figure 5 in the Supplementary Materials Appendix plots the prior and posterior probability distribu-
tions of a legislator being informative, λI and of the proposal being of high quality p for three issue areas
(Economic, Judiciary, and Government). The figure shows that the average overlap between prior and
posterior distributions is quite small. Similar patterns are verified across parameters and issue areas.
22Details from different simulation exercises and robustness checks are available from the authors upon
request. See also the Supplementary Materials accompanying this paper.
23Figure 1 in the Supplementary Materials Appendix summarizes the results for SRP votes. While there
are interesting differences in the details between these and bills considered On Passage, the main results
remain unchanged.
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[Figure 4 about here]
The top left panel presents the estimate of the signal precision qg ≡ Pr(sit = ωt|ωt, α(t) =
g) for state ωt and issue g. The chart presents the median value, and the 5 and 95 percentiles
of (a sample of 1000 observations drawn from) the posterior distribution of the parameters
of the model. Note that the estimates in all issue areas are very precise, as 90 percent of
the mass of the posterior is concentrated in a small interval around the median. In terms
of the value of the estimates, note that the precision of the signals is relatively large, close
to 0.9 in all issue areas. This suggests that private information - information dispersed in
the system that has not been made public and incorporated in the prior - is quite impor-
tant. The moderate heterogeneity across issue areas suggests that this conclusion holds
independently of issue class, at least within our relatively broad issue classification.
The top right panel presents the estimate of the common prior probability that the
proposal is of high quality, pg ≡ Pr(ωt = 1|α(t) = g). To calculate this, we first compute
for each point in the sample the proportion of roll calls with ωt = 1, and then compute the
median and 5-95 percentiles of this variable in the sample. The results suggest relatively
moderate beliefs about the quality or appropriateness of proposals being brought to a vote
in the House (possibly with the exception of the more favorable expectations in Foreign
Relations). This is consistent with our previous finding in terms of the value of private
information in the system.
The middle panels show the proportion of members of the House voting informatively
(left) and the proportion of members of the House voting uninformatively in favor of the
proposal (right). Recall that each point in the sample from the posterior distribution
includes a type for each legislator. Thus for each point in the sample we can compute the
proportion of legislators of each type. The chart presents the median, and 5-95 percentiles
of this variable in the sample. The results show that, according to our estimates, a large
fraction of the House votes according to their private information in each case. With the
exception of Foreign Relations, the proportion of legislators voting informatively ranges
from a relatively low 40% in the case of Appropriations bills, to a 50% in Judiciary bills.
In Foreign Relations the proportion is higher still: about 70% of the total members vote
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informatively. That this is large relative to the EMR cutpoint (lower left panel) means that
the public signal generated by the informative tally of votes in favor of the proposal in the
House can in fact sway the outcome in the Senate one way or the other. Moreover, most
individuals that do not vote informatively vote in favor of the proposal; i.e., the fraction
of members voting uninformatively against the proposal (the partisan-conservatives) is
relatively low across the different issue areas (as high as 6-7% for Foreign Relations and
Government Operations, substantially lower in all other issues).24
The bottom left panel shows the EMR voting equilibrium cutpoint in the receiving
committee. This is the smallest net number of favorable votes among individuals voting
informatively in the House for which the Senate passes the bill in equilibrium. The results
show that these EMR cutpoints are relatively large in all areas, with a smallest value of 23
in Judiciary, and a largest value of 108 in Appropriations.
The large EMR equilibrium cutpoints have two important implications. First, as it is
implied by the name, the EMR equilibrium cutpoint effectively imposes a supermajority
rule on the House, which can be computed given our estimates. Note that a cutpoint
ζ means that in order for the bill to pass the Senate, we need at least ζ net votes of
the members of the House voting informatively. This in turn means that if there are nY
partisan liberals and nN partisan conservatives, we need at least ζ + nY − nN net votes
out of all votes in total for the bill to pass the Senate (nY − nN is the net uninformative
tally). But this in turn means that in order for the bill to pass the Senate we need at least
ζ+nY −nN+n
2
positive votes in total to pass the Senate. Thus the rule for the entire chamber
is R = ζ+nY −nN+n
2
, or as a fraction of the membership,
R
n
=
1
2
+
ζ + nY − nN
2n
Similarly, we can compute the hurdle imposed on the set of individuals voting informa-
tively. This effective rule for the informative voters follows quite directly from the EMR
equilibrium cutpoint. Again, a cutpoint ζ means that in order for the bill to pass the
24This is consistent with the most informative EMR voting equilibrium, in which conservatives are
a blocking coalition in the receiving committee and all conservatives in the originating committee vote
informatively. We return to this below, where we examine the relationship between type allocation and
party label.
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Senate, we need at least RI =
ζ+nI
2
positive votes among the nI members of the House
voting informatively. Thus, in terms of the fraction of the total number of individuals
voting informatively,
RI
nI
=
1
2
+
ζ
2nI
The bottom right panel shows R/n and RI/nI for each issue area. The implied super-
majority on the entire chamber is R/n ' 4/5 on average across areas. In other words,
bicameralism is transformed in equilibrium into a unicameral system with a 4/5 superma-
jority rule. On the other hand, the threshold imposed on the members voting informatively
is about RI/nI ' 2/3 on average across areas. Both R/n and RI/nI have significant varia-
tion across issue areas. In particular, the EMR R/n is relatively low for Foreign Relations
(0.62) and largest for Economic issues (0.87) and Appropriations (0.89). Similarly, the
hurdle for members voting informatively is relatively lower for Foreign Relations (0.56) and
Judiciary (0.55), and largest for Economic issues (0.72) and Appropriations (0.80).
The large EMR cutpoints have a second important implication. The EMR cutpoints are
not only large in nominal terms, but also in relation with the value of private information
implicit in the estimates of q. Note that with q taking values above 0.85, the public signal
induced by the tally of votes in the House is very informative indeed: votes that are not
close (among informative voters) have a dramatic effect on the posterior inference about
the quality of the proposal. In fact, since Proposition 1 implies that ζ = ρ, we can use (1),
together with our estimates of q, p, and ζ to recover the bias pi such that a (conservative)
member would prefer the proposal to the status quo only if Pr(ωA|E) ≥ piQ. The result
of combining relatively informative signals and relatively large cutpoints leave no room for
ambiguity, implying piQ ≈ 1. In other words, the results imply a very conservative blocking
coalition in the Senate, in the sense that proposals are enacted into law only when it is
extremely likely that they are “good”.
Endogenous Classification of Amendments. Recall that we assumed that the final
outcome in the Senate is a binary up or down decision on the passage of a bill zt ∈ {0, 1}. We
treated zt ∈ {0, 1} as an unobservable variable from the perspective of the econometrician,
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who can only observe an imperfect signal zˆ ∈ {P,A, F} of zt ∈ {0, 1}, such that zˆt = F
when zt = 0 with some probability η (otherwise we observe it as amended), and that zˆt = P
when zt = 1 with some probability γ (otherwise we observe it as amended). The lower left
panel shows the estimates of γ and η: η ≈ 0.59 while γ ≈ 0.36. Note that by Bayes’ rule,
the posterior probability of the bill having failed given that we observe an ammendment is
Pr(zt = 0|zˆt = A) = (1− η) Pr(zt = 0)
(1− η) Pr(zt = 0) + (1− γ) Pr(zt = 1)
We can estimate Pr(zt = 1) by the proportion of bills with an informative tally above the
equilibrium cutpoint. Doing this gives 0.48 for Appropriations, 0.65 for Economic issues,
0.80 for Foreign Relations, 0.34 for Government Operations, ' 0.40 for Judiciary, and 0.69
for Other issues. We then find that Pr(zt = 0|zˆt = A) = 0.41 for Appropriations, 0.26
for Economic issues, 0.13 for Foreign Relations, 0.55 for Government Operations, 0.49 for
Judiciary, and 0.22 for Other issues. Thus we are classifying amended bills as relatively
likely to have passed in all areas. This is particularly so in Foreign Relations, Other and
Economic issues.
Passage of Bills in the Senate. In Section 3.1 (Figure 3) we presented the comparison
between the predicted passage of bills in the Senate implied by the spatial voting model
(OC estimates) and the actual Senate outcomes. We can now extend this comparison to
include our results.
[Figure 5 about here]
Figure 5 plots the actual and predicted passage rates for the sequential committees
model, and the SSV model assuming both a simple majority rule and a three-fifths majority
rule in the Senate. The sequential committee model clearly outperforms the SSV model
under either voting rule in this comparison.
6.1 Do Party Labels Explain Behavior?
In this paper, we have been completely agnostic about whether party labels might be
informative about the preferences or the behavior of members of Congress. In particular,
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we chose not to identify members of the majority party as being predisposed in favor of
the proposal and members of the minority party as being predisposed against the proposal.
Doing so would have been unduly restrictive.
Having said this, it is reasonable to expect that at the very least, parties will tend to
bundle like-minded individuals. Thus it is interesting to see whether there is a correlation
between the types we identify in the analysis and their partisan affiliation. A particular
hypothesis of interest is that members of the majority party are typically biased in favor
of the proposal (and thus are partisan-liberal behavioral types, typically voting in favor of
the proposal independently of their private information), and that members of the minor-
ity party are typically biased against the proposal, and then either vote informatively or
vote against the proposal independently of their private information (partisan-conservative
behavioral types). Is this hypothesis consistent with our results?
[Figure 6 about here]
The top panel in Figure 6 plots the proportion of members of the majority party classi-
fied as partisan liberals (bar) and the proportion of members of the minority party classified
as informative voters (line) per congress and issue area for Appropriations, Economic, and
Other issues. Clearly enough, this fit the pattern. Although there are some notable ex-
ceptions, in most periods and issues the individuals we classify as liberals are (mostly)
members of the majority, and the individuals that we classify as informative are (mostly)
members of the minority.
On the other hand, party labels are far from explaining all relevant behavior. The
lower panel in Figure 6 mimics the upper panel but for Foreign Relations, Government
Operations, and Judiciary. Here the story is altogether different. While in these areas
there are some periods and issues for which we observe the same pattern as in the previous
case, this is not the norm. Instead, in several issue/Congress observations, a majority of
members of both parties vote informatively. Still in other instances, a significant fraction
of the minority party is classified as partisan-conservative. We conclude that while party
labels do explain some behavior - in particular within Appropriations and Economic areas
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- party labels are generically a poor estimate for behavioral types in our model. A more
detailed analysis of the role of parties in this context is left for future research.
7 Conclusion
This paper makes a significant contribution to the debate about the policy consequences of
adopting a bicameral legislative body. One set of consequences is well understood. Since
at least Montesquieu (Montesquieu (1748)), bicameralism has been seen and used as a tool
to represent and protect the interests of special minorities (the aristocracy, the states).
Tsebelis and Money (1997) call this the political aspect of bicameralism. There is a second,
equally important argument in the debate, championed by Madison in the Federalist papers
(Hamilton, Jay, and Madison (1788)). This second aspect, which Tsebelis and Money call
the “efficiency” aspect of bicameralism, sees bicameralism as a tool to improve the quality
of political decisions. How this happens, and to what extent does bicameralism actually
enhance the quality of public policy is less understood.
In this paper, we explored the “efficiency” motivation of bicameralism. We showed,
first, that voting outcomes in both Houses are consistent with a model that incorporates
both ideology and common values into legislative decision-making, but not with the simple
purely ideological spatial model commonly used in the literature. We presented a model
consistent with common values and dispersed information, and argued that the data are
consistent with an equilibrium of the theoretical model in which the Senate only approves
House bills that pass an endogenous R-majority rule, determined in equilibrium. We then
estimated the parameters of the model using the votes of members of the House and the
Senate. We obtained three major conclusions:
(i) First, our estimates imply that private information (information dispersed in the sys-
tem that has not been made public and incorporated in the prior) is quite important.
For one, a large fraction of the House votes according to their private information
in each case (from 40% in the case of Appropriations bills, to a 50% in Judiciary
bills). Moreover, the results show that the informativeness or precision of the signals
is relatively large, above 0.85 in all issue areas.
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(ii) Second, we showed that the implied supermajority on the entire chamber isR/n ' 4/5
on average across areas. In other words, bicameralism is transformed in equilibrium
into a unicameral system with a four-fifths supermajority rule. This endogenous
majority rule has significant variation across areas: close to two thirds for Foreign
Relations, and larger for Economic issues (0.87) and Appropriations (0.89).
(iii) Third, we used the estimates to recover the bias piQ such that a (conservative) member
would prefer the proposal to the status quo only if Pr(ωA|E) ≥ piQ. The combination
of relatively precise signals and large cutpoints imply piQ ≈ 1. In other words, the
results imply a very conservative blocking coalition in the Senate, in the sense that
proposals are enacted into law only when it is extremely likely that their quality is
high.
This paper also provides a significant methodological contribution to the analysis of
voting in legislatures. To our knowledge, our paper represents the first study to estimate a
model of voting in legislatures that allows for common values with dispersed information
in an equilibrium context. This complements recent efforts in the literature to incorporate
strategic considerations to the analysis of voting in legislatures.
In spite of the advances, much work is left for future research. Three directions are note-
worthy. First, we see this paper as a first step towards achieving a more general framework
that can fully integrate the spatial model alongside with common value components and
dispersed information. In particular, it would be desirable to allow broader heterogeneity
in the biases of different individuals, as well as in the precision of their information (see
Iaryczower and Shum (2009) for a step in this direction within a single-committee setting).
Second, it is also key to refine this family of models by testing their empirical implications,
and comparing their success against other possible explanations for the patterns we un-
cover here. Finally, we hope that this paper will engage other researchers to expand the
application of the framework to other legislatures and institutions around the world.
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Figure 2: Tally of Votes in the House and Outcomes in the Senate
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 Figure 3: Actual and Predicted Outcomes in the Senate according to the SSV Model
37
Appropriations Economic Foreign Government Judiciary Other 
median 0.915 0.954 0.941 0.935 0.896 0.938 
5 % PER 0.911 0.949 0.933 0.928 0.888 0.933 
95 % PER 0.921 0.959 0.950 0.941 0.902 0.943 
0.880 
0.890 
0.900 
0.910 
0.920 
0.930 
0.940 
0.950 
0.960 
0.970 
Signal Precision (q) - On Passage 
Appropria'ons  Economic  Foreign  Government  Judiciary  Other 
median  0.644  0.456  0.784  0.463  0.336  0.457 
5 % PER  0.593  0.398  0.673  0.382  0.257  0.395 
95 % PER  0.695  0.520  0.884  0.555  0.419  0.520 
0.200 
0.300 
0.400 
0.500 
0.600 
0.700 
0.800 
0.900 
Common Prior Belief (p) ‐ On Passage 
Appropria'ons  Economic  Foreign  Government  Judiciary  Other 
median  0.416  0.430  0.712  0.462  0.505  0.436 
5 % PER  0.401  0.416  0.692  0.447  0.488  0.422 
95 % PER  0.431  0.444  0.731  0.479  0.523  0.450 
0.300 
0.350 
0.400 
0.450 
0.500 
0.550 
0.600 
0.650 
0.700 
0.750 
0.800 
Propor'on of Informa've Votes in the House ‐ On Passage 
Appropria'ons  Economic  Foreign  Government  Judiciary  Other 
median  0.557  0.564  0.220  0.482  0.482  0.551 
5 % PER  0.542  0.550  0.202  0.467  0.465  0.536 
95 % PER  0.572  0.577  0.237  0.498  0.498  0.565 
0.200 
0.250 
0.300 
0.350 
0.400 
0.450 
0.500 
0.550 
0.600 
Propor'on of Uninforma've Yeas in the House ‐ On Passage 
Approp.  Economic  Foreign  Government  Judiciary  Other  Pr(zhat=P|p)  Pr(zhat=F|F) 
median  108  83  38  78  23  58  0.360  0.585 
5 % PER  101  76  31  71  14  50  0.307  0.531 
95 % PER  115  91  45  85  30  65  0.415  0.675 
5 
25 
45 
65 
85 
105 
EMR Equilibrium Cutpoint ‐ On Passage 
Appropria'ons  Economic  Foreign  Government  Judiciary  Other 
For House  0.89  0.87  0.62  0.80  0.76  0.84 
For Info. Voters  0.80  0.72  0.56  0.69  0.55  0.65 
0.50 
0.55 
0.60 
0.65 
0.70 
0.75 
0.80 
0.85 
0.90 
0.95 
1.00 
Endogenous Majority Rule ‐ On Passage 
Figure 4: Precision, Prior, Distribution of Types, and Endogenous Majority Rule in votes
On Passage (µ = 0.10)
38
0.00	  
0.20	  
0.40	  
0.60	  
0.80	  
1.00	  
1.20	  
APPROP	  OP	   ECON	  OP	   ECON	  SRP	   FOR	  OP	   GOV	  OP	   GOV	  SRP	   JUD	  OP	   JUD	  SRP	   OTHER	  OP	   OTHER	  SRP	  
Actual	   SequenAal	  CommiEees	   SSV	  (simple	  majority)	   SSV	  (3/5s	  majority)	  
Figure 5: Actual and Predicted Passage Rates in the Senate for the Sequential Committees
model and the Spatial Voting model.
39
0.00 
0.10 
0.20 
0.30 
0.40 
0.50 
0.60 
0.70 
0.80 
0.90 
1.00 
C1
02
‐A
PP
 
C1
02
‐E
CO
 
C1
02
‐O
TH
 
C1
03
‐A
PP
 
C1
03
‐E
CO
 
C1
03
‐O
TH
 
C1
04
‐A
PP
 
C1
04
‐E
CO
 
C1
04
‐O
TH
 
C1
05
‐A
PP
 
C1
05
‐E
CO
 
C1
05
‐O
TH
 
C1
06
‐A
PP
 
C1
06
‐E
CO
 
C1
06
‐O
TH
 
C1
07
‐A
PP
 
C1
07
‐E
CO
 
C1
07
‐O
TH
 
C1
08
‐A
PP
 
C1
08
‐E
CO
 
C1
08
‐O
TH
 
C1
09
‐A
PP
 
C1
09
‐E
CO
 
C1
09
‐O
TH
 
Type Alloca<on by Party                                                            
(Appropria<ons, Economic & Other issues) 
% "Liberals" in the Majority  % Informa<ve Voters in the Minority 
0.00 
0.10 
0.20 
0.30 
0.40 
0.50 
0.60 
0.70 
0.80 
0.90 
1.00 
C1
02
‐F
O
R 
C1
02
‐G
O
V 
C1
03
‐G
O
V 
C1
04
‐F
O
R 
C1
04
‐G
O
V 
C1
04
‐J
U
D
 
C1
05
‐F
O
R 
C1
05
‐G
O
V 
C1
05
‐J
U
D
 
C1
06
‐F
O
R 
C1
06
‐G
O
V 
C1
06
‐J
U
D
 
C1
07
‐F
O
R 
C1
07
‐G
O
V 
C1
07
‐J
U
D
 
C1
08
‐G
O
V 
C1
08
‐J
U
D
 
C1
09
‐F
O
R 
C1
09
‐G
O
V 
C1
09
‐J
U
D
 
Type Alloca@on by Party                                                             
(Foreign Rela@ons, Government and Judiciary) 
% "Liberals" in the Majority  % Informa@ve Voters in the Minority 
Figure 6: Proportion of “Liberal” Types in the Majority Party and “Informative” Types
in the Minority Party, by Issue Area and Congress
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